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Bounty Hunters For Algorithmic 
Cartels: An Old Solution for a New 
Problem 
Aleksandra Lamontanaro* 
In light of the reality that pricing algorithms allow commercial 
actors to perform all phases of their price-fixing conspiracies with-
out leaving behind trails of traditional incriminating evidence, the 
scarcity of algorithmic cartels prosecutions is hardly surprising. 
Given well-documented evidence that the authorities struggle in 
their efforts to detect even conventional price-fixing cartels, it is  
imperative to come up with new tools for detecting algorithmic  
cartels, which have unprecedented potential to harm consumers if 
left ignored. This Note investigates algorithmic capabilities to col-
lude, as well as legal and technical challenges that governmental 
authorities face in confronting such collusion. This Note then intro-
duces two proposals to improve the detection of algorithmic cartels: 
cartel screening and a whistleblower bounty program. The Note  
argues that, although the optimal solution is to implement the  
whistleblower bounty program and cartel screening together, it 
would be more effective and efficient to launch the former before the 
latter. Importantly, by implementing the whistleblower bounty  
program before cartel screening, governmental authorities would 
gain the expertise necessary to enforce antitrust laws without  
impeding innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 6, 2015, a former executive of an online art deco  
retailer, David Topkins, became the first—and to this day, the last—
e-commerce seller that the Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “the 
Department”) prosecuted for using algorithms to fix prices.1  
Topkins pled guilty to raising and fixing prices of decorative post-
ers, prints, and other wall hangings sold in the United States through 
Amazon Marketplace.2 According to the charge, Topkins conspired 
with other art deco sellers to eliminate or minimize any price differ-
ences among them.3 To implement the conspiracy, Topkins wrote 
computer code on algorithm-based software that set prices accord-
ing to this arrangement. Referring to the Topkins case, the DOJ 
noted that, “We will not tolerate anticompetitive conduct, whether 
it occurs in a smoke-filled room or over the Internet using complex 
pricing algorithms.”4 In light of the Department’s expressed zeal to 
combat price-fixing conspiracies, casual observers might wonder 
why Topkins—involving relatively small retailers—is the only  
algorithmic price-fixing scheme that has ever been prosecuted in the 
United States. 
This Note investigates this dearth of internet-based price-fixing 
prosecutions and focuses on the newly emerging challenge of  
detecting price-fixing schemes facilitated by algorithms, which this 
Note refers to as “algorithmic cartels.” Although a number of schol-
ars have examined antitrust challenges that pricing algorithms pre-
sent, they have mainly focused on the legality of different types of 
algorithms, proposing legal frameworks such as standards for 
 
1 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price 
Fixing in the Antitrust Division’s First Online Marketplace Prosecution (Apr. 6, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-price-fixing-
antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace [https://perma.cc/DR4Y-V3HL] [hereinafter 
Press Release, Dep’t of Just.]. 
2 Id. See E-Retailers Beware: DOJ Files First Criminal Prosecution for Online Price 
Fixing, PERKINS COIE (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/e-
retailers-beware-doj-files-first-criminal-prosecution-for.html [https://perma.cc/5WUD-
8SES]. 
3 See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
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algorithmic regulations5 or means for outlawing algorithms that lead 
to tacit collusion.6 
While this Note recognizes new issues that tacit algorithmic col-
lusion has raised, it instead focuses on the limited detection of algo-
rithmic cartels that are already illegal under the current antitrust 
framework. Such a choice of focus stems from the reality that the 
authorities struggle in their efforts to detect even regular price-fixing 
cartels; in fact, the DOJ is only aware of an estimated ten to seven-
teen percent of cartels currently active.7 How can we address new 
challenges if we have not adequately handled the old ones? Given 
this low rate of cartel detection, it is safe to assume that Topkins’ 
outlier status is not evidence of digital cartels’ nonexistence but a 
testament to the difficulty of their detection. 
Addressing the obscure nature of algorithmic cartels, this Note 
analyzes two proposals to improve such cartels’ detection: (1) 
screening for cartels and (2) a whistleblower bounty program. The 
Note argues that, although the optimal solution is to implement the 
whistleblower bounty program and cartel screening together, it 
would be more effective and efficient to implement the former  
before the latter. By creating the whistleblower bounty program be-
fore launching cartel screening, governmental authorities will be 
 
5 See Ben Shneiderman, Algorithmic Accountability, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWuDgY8aHmU [https://perma.cc/82NK-ZSA2] 
(proposing to establish a “National Algorithm Safety Board” that would audit, monitor, 
and license algorithms before firms are allowed to use them); see also Andrew Tutt, An 
FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 91 (2017) (advocating for the launch of a new 
regulatory agency—similar to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration). 
6 See Joseph E. Harrington, Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous 
Artificial Agents, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 331, 350–54 (2018) (arguing that 
algorithms that use a reward-punishment scheme—that involves firms rewarding their 
rivals’ inflated prices by maintaining such prices and punishing their rivals’ deviation by 
undercutting them on price—should be deemed illegal per se). 
7 See Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 459 (2006) 
(finding that the likelihood a cartel will be detected is less than ten percent); see also 
Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 655 (2004) 
(stating that eighty percent of cartels in existence go undetected); Douglas H. Ginsburg & 
Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Nov. 8, 2010, at 3, 9, 
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1060
AntitrustSanctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD32-7YXP] (“The bulk of scholarly opinion is 
consistent with the view that despite ever-increasing levels of corporate fines and longer 
jail sentences, cartel activity is currently under-deterred.”). 
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able to gain expertise in complex algorithmic features, which must 
be understood in order to perform effective cartel screening.8  
Because whistleblowers such as algorithms’ developers, program-
mers, and computer technicians monitor algorithms on a daily  
basis, they are well-equipped to provide the authorities with  
valuable information about algorithmic properties that lead to collu-
sion. Over time, via the investigation of cases of algorithmic cartels 
uncovered by whistleblowers, U.S. agencies will acquire the neces-
sary expertise on this issue. This expertise, gained in practice, would 
help the authorities eliminate the risk of targeting benign algorithms, 
wasting resources, and potentially depressing innovation. 
Part I of this Note gives a brief explanation of what pricing  
algorithms actually are before presenting three scenarios where pric-
ing algorithms can facilitate anticompetitive collusion. Part I also 
analyzes the ability of U.S. antitrust law to deal with each of these 
scenarios. The three scenarios include circumstances where (1) 
competing firms9 use algorithms to implement price-fixing agree-
ments; (2) firms unilaterally program their algorithms to follow their 
rivals’ prices; and (3) firms unilaterally employ pricing algorithms 
that learn on their own to collude. Part I examines Professor Michael 
S. Gal’s argument that certain algorithmic features should give rise 
to the inference of an anticompetitive agreement.10 Further, Part I 
summarizes the results of the experimental studies that demonstrate 
the low probability of successful cooperation between self-learning 
algorithms that lack an explicit design feature to collude. Part I  
concludes that, if such features have to be explicit, adopting Gal’s 
proposal to consider certain algorithmic features as evidence from 
which a price-fixing agreement can be inferred would enable courts 
 
8 Ezrachi and Stucke propose to screen the digital markets for collusion. To better 
understand what factors are indicative of algorithmic collusion and, therefore, worth 
exploring further, Ezrachi and Stucke encourage enforcers to begin commissioning or 
internally conducting experimental research of pricing algorithms. See Ariel Ezrachi & 
Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit 
Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1806 (2017). 
9 When this Note refers to the term “firms,” it means entities or individuals that can set 
the prices of their products, including corporations, limited liability companies (LLC), and 
partnerships. 
10 See Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 77 
(2019). 
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to address tacit agreements—orchestrated with algorithms’ help—
within the current antitrust framework. Certainly, to develop case 
law as to what algorithmic features and circumstances surrounding 
their adoption would amount to circumstantial evidence of a price-
fixing conspiracy, the agencies have to first detect such cartels. 
Part II of this Note presents the challenges of detecting algorith-
mic cartels and explores possible solutions to such challenges. Par-
ticularly, Part II examines a proposal that tasks U.S. agencies with 
screening algorithms and digital markets to detect algorithmic car-
tels. Further, Part II identifies the passage of a whistleblower bounty 
statute as a solution to improve cartel detection. Analyzing the two 
solutions and determining that, ultimately, both are necessary, Part 
III of this Note concludes that implementing the whistleblower  
statute prior to cartel screening is the best course of action for U.S. 
agencies to take. 
I. ABILITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO ADDRESS ALGORITHMIC 
COLLUSION 
This Part of the Note examines three scenarios where pricing 
algorithms can facilitate anticompetitive collusion.11 First, compet-
ing firms can use algorithms to implement explicit price-fixing 
agreements.12 Second, firms may unilaterally instruct their algo-
rithms to fix prices: for example, by using the same or similar algo-
rithms as their competitors and feeding such algorithms the same 
data.13 Third, firms can unilaterally employ self-learning algo-
rithms.14 Programmed to maximize profits, these algorithms learn 
on their own that collusion is the best way to accomplish their des-
ignated goal.15 However, before delving into the legal analysis of 
each of the above scenarios, a brief explanation of what algorithms 
actually are is warranted. 
 
11 See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1782. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1783. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1783–84. 
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A. What Is a Pricing Algorithm? 
An algorithm is a sequence of rules that should be applied in 
precise order to perform a certain task.16 We all use (non-automated) 
algorithms in our daily lives: when we decide what time to leave the 
house, we use data inputs like destination, desired time of arrival, 
weather, and traffic conditions.17 Algorithmic computer codes do 
the same: the algorithms of a web-mapping service such as Google 
Maps perform tasks for individual users based on those users’ inputs 
(destination) and a variety of online sources (weather or traffic con-
ditions).18 Besides assisting consumers in solving day-to-day tasks, 
algorithms are also used for pricing decisions.19 For example, ride-
sharing companies such as Uber and Lyft use algorithms to set prices 
of car rides in real time based on the demand for rides and the supply 
of drivers.20 Algorithms allow computers to solve complex prob-
lems, and recent achievements in artificial intelligence (AI) and ma-
chine learning have further developed algorithmic capabilities.21 
Nowadays, algorithms can actually learn on their own.22 
Algorithms can learn through examples (supervised learning) 
where developers teach them with a training sample.23 To illustrate, 
imagine that Target wants to discount women’s shirts it sells online; 
a developer of Target’s algorithm can select a sample data set of 
different types of shirts and classify the items with the buttons on 
the left side as “women’s shirts on sale.”24 After the algorithm learns 
 
16 Gal, supra note 10, at 77. 
17 See id. 
18 Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
309, 310 (2017). 
19 Gal, supra note 10, at 80–81. 
20 See Sheng Li & Claire Chunying Xie, Automated Pricing Algorithms and Collusion: 
A Brave New World or Old Wine in New Bottles? 18 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (2018). 
21 ORG. ECON. CORP. DEV., Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the  
Digital Age 9 (2017), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Algorithms-and-colllusion-
competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.pdf [https://perma.cc/C348-JD9H] [hereinafter 
OECD]. 
22 Id. 
23 Ai Deng, Litigation Practicean Antitrust Lawyer’s Guide to Machine Learning, 32 
ANTITRUST ABA 82, 83 (2018). 
24 See id. 
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this classification feature, it can apply the same criteria to the rest of 
Target’s clothes.25 
Conversely, if Target wants to discount women’s shirts only if 
Walmart does, Target can apply the second type of learning tech-
nique: learning through differences.26 This technique would involve 
Target’s algorithm tracking online prices of Walmart for a period 
until it can characterize certain pricing behavior of Walmart as the 
“norm.”27 When Walmart deviates from that norm, the algorithm 
will flag such abnormality.28 
The third type of learning is learning through trial and error (re-
inforcement learning).29 Using this technique, the developer of Tar-
get’s algorithm would not provide the algorithm with any exam-
ples.30 Rather, the algorithm would act on its own by assessing its 
decisions based on the outcomes and using the learned lessons to 
make better decisions in the future.31 For example, programmed to 
“maximize profits,” Target’s algorithm can learn, through trial and 
error, that certain pricing decisions are more profitable than others; 
via this “machine learning,” the algorithm is taught to employ the 
best performing strategies in the future.32 
This tremendous power and utility provided by pricing algo-
rithms have brought enormous benefits to both businesses and con-
sumers.33 Algorithms can personalize customers’ shopping experi-
ences based on their past purchases, preferences, and demographic 
information.34 Using algorithms, businesses can better identify 
profit-maximization prices by analyzing historical sales perfor-
 
25 Id. 
26 See id at 84. 
27 See id. (explaining that the identification of anomaly is widely used in fraud 
detection). 
28 See id. For example, after an algorithm tracks a credit card user’s spending behavior, 
the algorithms are able to characterize certain behavior as the “norm”; when the card is 
used in a new geographic location, the algorithm will flag such transaction, raising a fraud 
alert. Id. 
29 Id. at 85. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Gal, supra note 10, at 78. 
33 Id. at 78–79. 
34 Id. at 80. 
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mance data.35 Moreover, algorithms allow firms to offer more accu-
rate market prices for products and services by balancing supply and 
demand in real time.36 Such dynamic pricing enables firms to adjust 
their prices as soon as new information—such as rival firms’ prices 
or changes in sales and inventories—is received.37 For instance, 
brick-and-mortar stores increasingly adapt dynamic pricing algo-
rithms to match the latest offers from online competitors.38 Notably, 
this trend correlates with the physical stores’ 4.2-percent increase in 
2019 Black Friday sales compared to 2018, which suggests that dy-
namic pricing can save brick-and-mortar businesses from going ex-
tinct in light of the ever-growing and increasingly dominant online 
retail sector.39 
One fact is clear: humans cannot possibly collect, organize, and 
analyze data as rapidly as algorithms do.40 As innovator Elon Musk 
observed, “[a] computer can communicate at a trillion bits per sec-
ond, but your thumb can maybe do . . . ten bits per second or a hun-
dred if you’re being generous.”41 Giving these clear advantages of 
pricing algorithms, it is not surprising that more and more firms em-
ploy them to make commercial decisions.42 Because pricing algo-
rithms can be of economic advantage not only to businesses but also 
consumers, the widespread use of these algorithms are here to stay. 
Thus, it is imperative to find the optimal method to enhance the de-
tection of algorithms that are used to carry out price-fixing conspir-
acies that harm consumers and violate antitrust law. 
 
35 Harrington, supra note 6, at 353. 
36 Li & Xie, supra note 20, at 1. 
37 Harrington, supra note 6, at 353. 
38 Li & Xie, supra note 20, at 1. 
39 See Black Friday Brick-and-Mortar Sales Up 4.2% According to SpendTrend Data, 
BUS. WIRE (Dec. 1, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20191201005183/en/Black-Friday-Brick-and-Mortar-Sales-4.2-SpendTrend-Data 
[https://perma.cc/3PTE-87C8]. 
40 Harrington, supra note 6, at 353. 
41 Steve Renick, Elon Musk at the World Government Summit 2017 in Dubai: 
Conversation with Mohammad AlGerga, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2017), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=R5dHlLjOdjk [https://perma.cc/G4RQ-SJJN]. 
42 Gal, supra note 10, at 79. 
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B. Scenario #1: Use of Algorithms to Implement Price-Fixing 
Agreements 
Algorithmic cartels—schemes that involve the firms’ use of  
algorithms to implement their explicit price-fixing agreements—are 
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.43 Section 1 is interpreted 
as outlawing only unreasonable restraints of trade.44 The agreement 
between two competitors to fix prices—whether to raise, depress, or 
stabilize them—is per se illegal, even if unsuccessful.45 Under the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine of per se illegality rather than the typical 
“rule of reason” analysis, courts do not examine the anticompetitive 
effects of such agreements.46 Rather, the per se rule operates as a 
“conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.”47 
The use of algorithms as a tool to implement, monitor, police, or 
strengthen an explicit price-fixing agreement among competitors by 
using pre-loaded data and orders falls easily under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.48 Topkins illustrates such a scheme; there, Topkins 
and other online art deco sellers used pricing algorithms as a tool to 
eliminate any online price differences between these retailers.49 
Similarly, in 2018, the European Commission (“Commission”) 
fined Trod Limited and GB Eye over €111 million for fixing prices 
using an algorithm.50 There, the parties agreed to fix online prices 
on decorative picture frames and carried out their conspiracy using 
 
43 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
44 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018). 
45 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979). 
46 Most restraints of trade are analyzed under the “rule of reason,” which “requires courts 
to conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and market structure . . . to assess 
the [restraint]’s actual effect on competition.” Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
47 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). 
48 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1787. 
49 See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 1. 
50 Noel Beale & Sandra Mapara, Competition Law and Ecommerce: ‘It Wasn’t Me, It 
Was the Algorithm!’, BURGES SALMON (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.burges-
salmon.com/news-and-insight/legal-updates/competition-law-and-ecommerce-it-wasnt-
me-it-was-the-algorithm [https://perma.cc/V8JB-T4QS]. 
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an algorithm that monitored and adjusted their prices to ensure that 
they did not undercut each other.51 
Another variation of the digital cartel scenario is a “hub-and-
spoke” scheme, where competitors (spokes) use a common pricing 
algorithm (hub) to execute their price-fixing agreement.52 The 
Meyer v. Kalanick case illustrates this variety of conspiracy.53  
Alleging that Uber’s algorithm (hub) established inflated surge pric-
ing, which drivers (spokes) charged while knowing that other Uber 
drivers would not be undercutting that price, Spencer Mayer, an 
Uber customer, filed a complaint against the massive ride-sharing 
corporation and its then-CEO in the Southern District of New 
York.54 Noting that “[a]utomation is effected through a human  
design,” Judge Jed S. Rakoff found that Meyer’s allegations were 
sufficient to withstand Uber’s motion to dismiss.55 
Although Uber ultimately removed the case to arbitration,56 the 
District Court reached its decision that the complaint contained suf-
ficient allegations of a conspiracy by applying well-settled case law 
interpreting the Sherman Act.57 The court explained that the drivers 
had signed up for Uber with the understanding that they all were 
agreeing to the same pricing determined by Uber’s algorithm.58 
Judge Rakoff pointed out that if Uber drivers were working inde-
pendently, it would have been against their own interest not to com-
pete on prices.59 The court rejected Uber’s argument that its drivers, 
who are independent contractors, had joined Uber’s platform in or-
der to take advantage of its services rather than fix prices.60 As the 
 
51 Id. 
52 See generally Gal, supra note 10, at 105. 
53 See generally Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
54 See id. at 819. 
55 Id. at 826. 
56 See generally Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017). 
57 Sonia Kuester Pfaffenroth, Pricing Algorithms: The Antitrust Implications, ARNOLD 
& PORTER (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/
2018/04/pricing-algorithms-the-antitrust-implications [https://perma.cc/34KE-3JPR]. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. The Luxembourg’s Competition Authority (LCA) also investigated the use of a 
pricing algorithm to orchestrate a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Michele Giannino, Webtaxi: 
The Luxembourg Competition Authority Exempts an Algorithmic Price-Fixing 
Arrangement on Efficiency Grounds, CORE BLOG (July 10, 2018), https://coreblog.
1270        FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:1259 
 
court’s analysis in Meyer demonstrates, the hub-and-spoke scheme 
is not new to the antitrust community: competitors have been using 
a common third party to coordinate their conspiracies long before 
the emergence of algorithms.61 The then-head of the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) Maureen Ohlhausen suggested a simple test 
that captures cases like Meyer and Topkins: “If it isn’t ok[ay] for a 
guy named Bob to do it, then it probably isn’t ok[ay] for an algo-
rithm to do it either.”62 
C. Scenario #2: Unilateral Use of Algorithms to Achieve Parallel 
Pricing 
Rival firms’ unilateral adoption of algorithms to mirror each 
other’s prices—thereby achieving equilibrium of inflated prices—is 
 
lexxion.eu/webtaxi-the-luxembourg-competition-authority-exempts-an-algorithmic-price-
fixing-arrangement-on-efficiency-grounds/ [https://perma.cc/WW5V-2CJT]. The case 
involved a booking platform—Webtaxi—that used an algorithm to set nonnegotiable taxi 
prices for all the participating drivers. Id. In 2018, although the LCA found the arrangement 
to constitute a price-fixing agreement, the LCA exempted the arrangement due to the 
efficiencies it generated, including lower prices to some customers and the reduction of 
wait time. Id. 
61 “[C]ourts have long recognized the existence of ‘hub-and-spoke’ conspiracies in 
which an entity at one level of the market structure, the ‘hub,’ coordinates an agreement 
among competitors at a different level, the ‘spokes.’ These arrangements consist 
of both vertical agreements between the hub and each spoke and a horizontal agreement 
among the spokes to adhere to the [hub’s] terms, often because the spokes would not have 
gone along with [the vertical agreements] except on the understanding that the other 
[spokes] were agreeing to the same thing.” Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 824 (quoting 
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226–27 (1939)). U.S. v. Apple Inc. is a 
relatively recent case involving hub-and-spoke conspiracy. 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015). 
To ensure that Amazon does not undercut Apple on e-book prices, Apple got publishers to 
change their pricing arrangements with Amazon. The court found that Apple (hub) 
conspired with the publishers (spokes) to raise the price of e-books in violation of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act. Apple, 791 F.3d at 335. Although the court found the conspiracy 
illegal per se, the court also held that the agreement would have been illegal even under 
the rule of reason analysis. See id. Addressing Apple’s argument that the arrangement was 
needed to bring iPad to market, the court refused to “score these hardware innovations as 
procompetitive benefits of the agreement between Apple and the Publishers to raise 
prices.” Id. 
62 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Should We Fear the Things That Go Beep in the Night?  
Some Initial Thoughts on the Intersection of Antitrust Law and Algorithmic Pricing, FED.  
TRADE COMM’N 10 (May 23, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1220893/ohlhausen_-_concurrences_5-23-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MVK7-QR24]. 
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known as parallel pricing strategy, or conscious parallelism, and is 
legal under the current antitrust framework.63 Professors Ariel Ez-
rachi and Maurice E. Stucke refer to such a parallel pricing  
scenario as the “Predictable Agent.”64 Parallel pricing typically oc-
curs among rival firms in an oligopoly65 without any agreement 
among the firms.66 In highly concentrated markets, “economists ob-
serve high interdependence and mutual self-awareness between 
sellers, which makes parallel decision-making more likely.”67 Com-
petitors independently mirror each other’s prices and come to a mu-
tual tacit understanding that they all are better off in the long term 
by maintaining inflated prices rather than engaging in a price war.68 
This concern that oligopolies engaging in parallel pricing can  
raise their prices above competitive levels is known as the “oligop-
oly problem.”69 
Algorithmic parallel pricing can also occur where rival firms, 
without any illegal communication, use the same third-party algo-
rithm by electronically sending it their cost data, which leads to price 
equilibrium.70 For example, if competing retailers contribute data to 
the same third-party algorithm, that algorithm can determine that 
parallel pricing is the best profit-maximizing strategy because stabi-
lizing inflated prices increases profits for retailers and the algo-
rithm’s vendor.71 Therefore, although rival retailers used the same 
algorithm, they did not necessarily agree to fix their prices.72 The 
Supreme Court “has never held that proof of parallel business 
 
63 See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1783. 
64 Id. at 1783. 
65 Oligopoly is “the market condition that exists when there are few sellers, as a result 
of which they can greatly influence price and other market factors.” Oligopoly, 
DICTIONARY, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/oligopoly [https://perma.cc/WB96-
Z99V]. 
66 See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790. 
67 Kaylynn Noethlich, Artificially Intelligent and Free to Monopolize: A New Threat to 
Competitive Markets Around the World, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 923, 927 (2019). 
68 See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790. 
69 Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the 
Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 144–
45 (1993). 
70 See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1783–84, 1788. 
71 See id. at 1783–84, 1787–88. 
72 See id. at 1783–84, 1788. 
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behavior conclusively establishes an agreement or, phrased differ-
ently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense.”73 
Independent conduct (when competitors act in parallel without  
regard to one another’s actions) and interdependent conduct,  
so-called conscious parallelism (when firms take into account how 
other firms are expected to react), do not constitute “agreement.”74 
Although the Supreme Court has ultimately declined to address 
the oligopoly problem by deeming parallel pricing unlawful, the is-
sue was highly debated.75 Professor and former Judge Richard A. 
Posner once argued that the oligopoly problem could be addressed 
by the Sherman Act.76 Posner explained that a concentrated market 
structure and voluntary parallel pricing strategies—such as signal-
ing and responding with prices—could permit an inference of  
a tacit conspiracy.77 To the contrary, Professor Donald Turner ar-
gued that tacit coordination by an oligopoly should not be regarded 
as “agreement” in violation of the Sherman Act.78 Turner warned 
that courts would not be able to communicate a clear and effective 
standard that would identify illegal conduct that must be enjoined 
because it was unreasonable to expect firms to ignore the prices of 
their rivals.79 
 
73 Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954). 
74 Gal, supra note 10, at 99. 
75 See id. at 99–100. 
76 Id. 
77 See generally Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested 
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1968). Posner’s approach to the oligopoly problem has 
not prevailed in the courts, even in the opinion of Judge Posner. See DOUGLAS A. MELAMED 
ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 202 (Robert C. 
Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2018). Judge Posner commented that “it is not a violation of 
antitrust law for a firm to raise its price, counting on its competitors to do likewise (but 
without any communication with them on the subject) and fearing the consequences if they 
do not.” Id.; see Richard A. Posner, Review of Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price 
Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 766 (2014) (repudiating his earlier view); see also Gal, 
supra note 10, at 100 (finding that Posner’s early view has recently been supported by 
Harvard University Law Professor Louis Kaplow who argues that the distinction between 
express collusion and conscious parallelism “does not serve social welfare” and the 
definition of “agreement” should include both). 
78 See generally Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: 
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). 
79 Gal, supra note 10, at 100; Baker, supra note 69, at 171. 
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Courts have ultimately adopted the Turner practical approach 
that focuses on identifying conduct that can sensibly be prohibited.80 
As then-Judge Stephen Breyer stated, “[I]ndividual pricing deci-
sions (even when each firm rests its own decisions upon its belief 
that competitors do the same) do not constitute an unlawful agree-
ment under Section 1 of the Sherman Act . . . .”81 Supreme Court 
Justice Breyer later explained that such reading of the Sherman Act 
is not because “[parallel] pricing is desirable (it is not), but because 
it is close to impossible to devise a judicially enforceable remedy 
for ‘interdependent’ pricing.”82 Particularly, courts cannot reasona-
bly order “a firm to set its prices without regard to the likely reac-
tions of its competitors.”83 
Accordingly, firms that unilaterally adopt pricing algorithms 
and program them to follow the price increase of their competitors 
do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act; under the law as  
currently interpreted, the firms do not explicitly agree to anything.84 
Each firm independently makes a decision, based on its self-interest, 
to adopt a particular algorithm; and the adopted algorithm does not 
“agree,” as is conventionally understood, to collude with other algo-
rithms.85 Rather, each firm, like in a classic parallel-pricing  
scenario, realizes on its own that the best profit-maximizing strategy 
is to follow the price increase of others.86 
D. Parallel Pricing with “Plus Factors” 
Conscious parallelism—where firms code their algorithms to 
look out for the opportunity to establish the interdependence  
of prices without taking part in any concerted illegal action— 
is perfectly legal.87 In Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film 
Distributing Corp., the Supreme Court held that conscious parall-
 
80 Baker, supra note 69, at 171 (“This argument for deeming parallel pricing among 
oligopolists a violation of § 1 was ultimately rejected by the antitrust mainstream, for the 
reasons set forth in Donald Turner’s influential 1962 article on conscious parallelism.”). 
81 Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1791. 
87 Id. 
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elism is not equivalent to an illegal agreement; the Court further 
stated that “[t]he crucial question is whether respondents’ conduct 
toward petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from an 
agreement, tacit or express.”88 In a more recent decision, Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court confirmed that “agree-
ment” must involve either express or tacit (implicit) formulation.89 
Thus, in parallel pricing cases, the focus is on identifying the 
existence of a tacit agreement.90 As the term suggests, a tacit agree-
ment refers to an agreement that is not explicitly expressed but  
rather is implied or indicated.91 The Supreme Court has held that 
business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which 
the factfinder may infer “agreement.”92 For instance, in Interstate 
Circuit, Inc. v. U.S., decided in 1939, the Court inferred “agree-
ment” where a firm communicated a proposed course of conduct to 
its rivals as well as to customers and the conduct was subsequently 
adopted by the industry with minor modifications.93 In affirming the 
illegality of the arrangement, the Supreme Court reasoned that “an 
unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without simultane-
ous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators.”94 The Court 
further explained that acceptance of an invitation to participate in a 
price-fixing conspiracy is sufficient to establish a violation of  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.95 Seven years later, in American  
Tobacco Co. v. U.S., the Court found the existence of an “agree-
 
88 Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41(1954) 
(holding that distributors’ action violated Section 1 where distributors, knowing that 
concerted action was contemplated and invited, gave their adherence to the scheme and 
participated in it). 
89 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007). 
90 Gal, supra note 10, at 105–06. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (finding “agreement” based on evidence that the distributors 
met individually with the exhibitors and each distributor was aware that the others had 
received identical letters proposing the new marketing procedures; but no evidence was 
offered that distributors ever met to discuss the arrangement); accord United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) (holding that, in order to find a 
conspiracy, “[i]t is not necessary to find an express agreement” . . . [i]t is enough that a 
concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the arrangement.”). 
94 Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 226. 
95 Id. 
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ment” where the parties’ actions could not be explained by their self-
interest, as their prices rose when costs declined.96 The subsequent 
Supreme Court’s decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp.—addressing minimum-resale price-maintenance conspiracy 
allegations—noted that “[t]he correct standard is that there must be 
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action 
by the [parties].”97 
The above-described Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates 
two conceptual points of reference. First, the Court can find “agree-
ment” even when coordination among firms lacks a direct exchange 
of assurances. Second, the Court entertains the inference of “agree-
ment” where circumstantial evidence suggests that parallel pricing 
was more likely than not an outcome of concerted action. To assist 
in separating conscious parallelism from a tacit agreement, lower 
courts have endorsed the concept of “plus factors,” which refers to 
circumstantial evidence that permits the inference of an actual 
agreement as opposed to independent actions.98 Recognizing that “a 
knowing wink [could] mean more than words,” the Ninth Circuit 
gave an example of circumstances that would warrant the court to 
submit the question regarding the existence of a conspiracy to a jury: 
Let us suppose five competitors meet on several  
occasions, discuss their problems, and one finally 
states—‘I won’t fix prices with any of you, but here 
is what I am going to do—put the price of my gidget 
at X dollars; now you all do what you want’ . . . . All 
leave and fix ‘their’ prices at ‘X’ dollars. We do not 
say the foregoing illustration compels an inference in 
this case that the competitors’ conduct constituted a 
price-fixing conspiracy, including an agreement to so 
 
96 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805 (1946). In markets free of 
collusion, when costs of production decrease, it is against a firm’s self-interest to increase 
the end-price of its product because the firm risks to lose its customers who would start 
buying the same or similar product cheaper from other competing firms. See generally  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES  
(Aug. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html 
[https://perma.cc/PX2C-945H]. 
97 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
98 Gal, supra note 10, at 105–06. 
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conspire, but neither can we say, as a matter of law, 
that an inference of no agreement is compelled.99 
Besides conduct that conveys mutual assurances, firms’ prac-
tices that facilitate coordination have also been deemed “plus  
factors” in certain circumstances.100 As then-Judge Sotomayor 
wrote, “in the absence of direct ‘smoking gun’ evidence, a horizon-
tal price-fixing agreement may be inferred on the basis of conscious 
parallelism, when such interdependent conduct is accompanied by 
circumstantial evidence and plus factors such as defendants’ use of 
facilitating practices.”101 Facilitating practices and circumstantial 
evidence may include conspirators’ communication in person, via 
emails, or via phone calls, and an indication that such communica-
tion was not conducted in the ordinary course of business.102 Thus, 
under certain circumstances, courts treat the adoption of practices 
that facilitate coordination as a “plus factor” that serves as an indi-
rect indication of “agreement.” 
E. Algorithmic Parallel Pricing Without Pro-Competitive 
Justifications as a “Plus Factor” 
Professor Michael S. Gal argues that certain circumstances sur-
rounding the use of algorithms can be treated as “plus factors” that 
establish the inference of “agreement” once parallel pricing is 
proven.103 Gal suggests several situations where the use of algo-
rithms should raise red flags and warrant further investigation of 
their legality.104 
In each of Gal’s contemplated scenarios, the firms engage in par-
allel pricing by using their algorithms in a non-optimal way, which 
reveals collusion to onlookers.105 For instance, when competing 
firms use similar algorithms, although superior algorithms are 
 
99 Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965). 
100 Gal, supra note 10, at 103–04. 
101 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.). 
102 Anderson News, LLC v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 187–89 (2d. Cir. 2012). 
103 Gal, supra note 10, at 110, 179–80 (arguing that “given the shortcomings of existing 
law in addressing algorithmic-facilitated coordination,” courts should “treat[] the adoption 
of facilitating practices, by itself, as a basis for liability”). 
104 Id. at 113–15. 
105 Id. at 115. 
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available to them, this suggests collusion.106 Furthermore, firms 
might feed their algorithms similar data even though they can easily 
access better data sources.107 Moreover, although better case studies 
are available, the firms may train their algorithms with similar case 
studies regardless.108 Finally, by making their algorithms easily ob-
servable to their competitors, firms can enable their algorithms to 
signal to competitors how the firms will react to market conditions, 
thereby communicating intent and commitment.109 According to 
Gal, if such acts lead to parallel pricing, the authorities should in-
vestigate them further to make sure that these algorithms’ possible 
beneficial effects do not tilt the balance toward their anticompetitive 
outcomes.110 Given that it is often the case that algorithmic func-
tions—such as gathering and analyzing data—create efficiencies 
that reduce costs or increase the quality of production, they should 
be allowed.111 However, other functions—such as making pricing 
data transparent to everyone—may be used to enable coordina-
tion.112 Thus, it is important to analyze all these functions together 
to see whether it is possible to achieve the benefits of the former 
without the harm of the latter.113 
Gal explains that an easy case would involve one firm rendering 
its algorithms transparent only to its rivals, by, for example, encrypt-
ing its information so that only competitors can read it.114 Because 
such discriminatory access clearly serves neither consumers nor the 
firm acting unilaterally, the collusion is evident. Gal has also  
hypothesized that even if a firm makes its algorithm transparent to 
everybody, such action, depending on the circumstances, can still be 
considered as a “plus factor” for facilitation of unlawful comm-uni-
cation.115 The relevant questions would be whether the transparency 
benefits consumers and whether the firm otherwise has an interest 
 
106 Id. at 113. 
107 Id. at 113–14. 
108 Id. at 114. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 113. 
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 114. 
115 Id. 
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in preserving the content of its algorithm or the database as a trade 
secret, as an answer in the negative to the former and in the affirm-
ative to the latter would indicate that there is collusion with the 
firm’s competitors.116 
Gal’s proposed “plus factors” fit neatly into the current jurispru-
dence on tacit price-fixing agreements. These “plus factors” encom-
pass the conceptual points established by the Supreme Court and 
further developed by lower courts. First, all of the circumstances ad-
dressed by Gal involve firms that use their algorithms to communi-
cate their intentions to act in a certain way and their reliance on oth-
ers to follow in their steps.117 Second, the fact that the firms’ avoid-
able acts have no competitive rationale excludes the possibility that 
they acted independently.118 
F. Scenario #3: Unilateral Use of Self-Learning Pricing 
Algorithms 
The third scenario involves firms that unilaterally employ self-
learning algorithms that establish price equilibrium after learning on 
their own that it is the best profit-maximizing strategy. Ezrachi and 
Stucke refer to this category of algorithms as “Digital Eye.”119 “Dig-
ital Eye” algorithms use “Deep Learning,” which is a highly sophis-
ticated method of reinforcement learning that “mimic[s] the brain’s 
cognitive and computational mechanisms.”120 A deep learning algo-
rithm “processes raw data in a complex, fast, and accurate way . . . 
and delivers an optimal output without revealing the relevant  
features that were behind the decision process.”121 Accordingly, 
firms that use deep learning algorithms can genuinely reach collu-
sive outcomes without even knowing about it, which raises a chal-
lenging question of whether the authorities can impose any liability 
on such firms.122 
 
116 Id. 
117 See id. at 115. 
118 See id. 
119 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1783–84. 
120 Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-
Measures, OECD 23 (June 2017) (unpublished Note for the 127th meeting of OECD 
Roundtable on Algorithms and Collusion). 
121 OECD, supra note 21, at 32. 
122 Id. 
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Currently, collusion reached by self-learning algorithms is per-
fectly legal. Because courts concur that to find “agreement” in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act, “there must be some overt act of commu-
nication to create or sustain that mutual understanding,”123 firms that 
collude by merely employing autonomous algorithms do not violate 
Section 1.124 Absent a fundamental change in antitrust jurispru-
dence, it is very unlikely that even a well-elaborated argument—
e.g., that algorithms can “communicate the requisite mutual under-
standing” to collude in violation of the Sherman Act—can convince 
the courts that algorithms, like humans, can reach an agreement to 
fix prices.125 This view is supported by DOJ Antitrust Division offi-
cials, who maintain that “tacit collusion through [algorithms] . . . is 
not illegal without an agreement among participants.”126 Yet, despite 
their current legality, “self-learning algorithms can more easily de-
termine the price that maximizes joint profits and which harms con-
sumers the most.”127 
In light of the potential threat that self-learning algorithms pose 
to consumers, Professor Joseph E. Harrington proposes a change to 
antitrust law.128 Harrington argues that the authorities should outlaw 
pricing algorithms that use a reward–punishment scheme, which in-
volves firms rewarding their rivals’ inflated prices by maintaining 
such prices and punishing their rivals’ deviation by undercutting 
them on price.129 Harrington contends that properties of learning al-
gorithms that produce efficiencies—such as estimating supply and 
demand, identifying most profitable price under given market con-
ditions, swiftly adjusting to changes in market conditions, and per-
sonalizing prices for consumers—are not relevant to the establish-
ment of a reward–punishment scheme that generates collusion.130 
 
123 Harrington, supra note 6, at 346. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 348. 
126 Pallavi Guniganti, US DOJ Deputy: Algorithmic Cartel Requires Agreement, GLOBAL 
COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/
1153380/us-doj-deputy-algorithmic-cartel-requires-agreement [https://perma.cc/9B8F-
9RY5]. 
127 OECD, supra note 21, at 33. 
128 See Harrington, supra note 6, at 350. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 354. 
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According to Harrington, since the properties of pricing algorithms 
that generate efficiency are distinct from the features that  
promote collusion, it is possible to identify a set of pricing  
algorithms that should be illegal per se.131 Meanwhile, Harrington 
also humbly admits that “[w]e know far too little about algorithmic  
collusion . . . .”132 
However, the fact that we know very little about algorithmic col-
lusion, coupled with efficiencies generated by pricing algorithms 
which benefit consumers, is precisely why it is very unlikely that 
courts will entertain Harrington’s proposal of deeming certain algo-
rithms per se illegal. From an antitrust policy standpoint, the U.S. 
courts remain largely dedicated to the Chicago School of thinking 
that gained mainstream prominence in the 1970s and 1980s.133 The 
Chicago School philosophy focuses on efficiencies in the market 
and consumer welfare (in the sense of harms and benefits to ultimate 
consumers).134 Moreover, the Supreme Court, over the past forty 
years, has been moving away from its application of the per se rule 
because the rule “can . . . prohibit[] procompetitive conduct [that] 
the antitrust laws should encourage.”135 
 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 358. 
133 See Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 718–19, 720, 722 
(2017) (arguing against the Chicago School approach to antitrust in the context of Section 
2 of the Sherman Act that—unlike Section 1 that is concerned with concerted conduct 
between rivals—addresses unilateral anticompetitive conduct). Khan explains that the 
Chicago School’s view that “market power is always fleeting—and hence antitrust 
enforcement rarely needed” does not reflect the true dynamics of a powerful online 
platform, such as Amazon Marketplace, that can maintain its monopoly indefinitely due to 
a strong network effect and Amazon’s ability to drive competitors out by engaging in 
predatory pricing rather than competing on the merits. Id. 
134 James Keyte, Why the Atlantic Divide on Monopoly/Dominance Law and 
Enforcement Is So Difficult to Bridge, 33 ANTITRUST ABA 113, 115 (2018). 
135 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879 (2007); see 
supra Part I.B. It should be noted that the trend of moving away from the application of 
the per se rule is observed only in cases that deal with antitrust issues arising out of parties’ 
unilateral anticompetitive conduct, such as unfair monopolization. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 
U.S. at 907 (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911) and holding vertical price restraints subject to rule of reason); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 7, 22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) and 
holding vertical maximum price fixing is not subject to per se rule); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) and rejecting per se rule for vertical non-price restrictions). 
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The possibility that collusion of self-learning algorithms will 
lead to inflated prices has also generated an outcry among scholars 
and practitioners for regulatory measures.136 Some observers argue 
that governmental authorities should create new regulatory bodies 
to oversee algorithms.137 For instance, Professor Ben Shneiderman 
proposes to establish a “National Algorithm Safety Board” that 
would audit, monitor, and license algorithms before firms are  
allowed to use them.138 Attorney Andrew Tutt advocates for the 
launch of a new regulatory agency— similar to the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration—which would attempt to “prevent the intro-
duction of algorithms into the market until their safety and efficacy 
has been proven through evidence-based premarket trials.”139 It 
should be noted that the SEC has already introduced efforts to  
regulate algorithmic trading.140 While the assessment of the afore-
mentioned regulatory measures is beyond the scope of this Note,  
regardless of whether certain properties of self-learning algorithms 
that lead to tacit collusion will ever be outlawed or regulated in  
the future, authorities would still face the challenges of detecting 
such collusion. 
G. Addressing an Actual, Rather Than Theoretical, Threat of 
Algorithmic Collusion 
Empirically, we have not seen a case where algorithms, either 
simply coded to maximize profits or explicitly programmed to  
 
136 See, e.g., Tutt, supra note 5; Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, 
Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General 
Data Protection Regulation, INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 77 (2017); Elon Musk, National 
Governors Association, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=245&v=b3lzEQANdHk [https://perma.cc/363T-59S3]. 
137 Daniel Castro & Joshua New, Center for Data Innovation, Comment to the FTC on 
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century Hearings: Background on 
Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and Predictive Analytics, and Applications of the 
Technologies 5 (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
comments/2019/02/ftc-2018-0101-d-0012-164560.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7BU-5HB5]. 
138 Shneiderman, supra note 5. 
139 Tutt, supra note 5, at 91. 
140 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 77175, 81 FR 9235 (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2016/34-77175.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9X7-QNPR] 
(adopting a rule requiring “persons who are primarily responsible for the design, 
development[,] or significant modifications of algorithmic trading strategies” to register 
with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)). 
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collude, led to collusion.141 However, a number of experimental 
studies have demonstrated that such algorithmic collusion is possi-
ble.142 In one study—that took several years to design—ten  
researchers from nine universities across four continents examined 
the behavior of twenty-five algorithms in a variety of contexts.143 
The study found that all of the examined algorithms learned to  
cooperate effectively.144 Nevertheless, the researchers emphasized a 
number of technical challenges, such as algorithms’ diminished 
ability to cooperate and elicit cooperation without prior knowledge 
of the other algorithms’ behavior.145 These and other challenges  
often led an algorithm to defect rather than to cooperate “even when 
doing so would be beneficial to the algorithm’s long-term pay-
offs.”146 Moreover, most of the studies that have confirmed algorith-
mic capabilities to collude assumed an unchanging market environ-
ment: the rewards for algorithms and the environment in which  
algorithms operated were typically fixed.147 In a real market envi-
ronment, algorithmic cooperation can be significantly undermined 
because demand uncertainty and other variabilities make it hard for 
an algorithm to understand whether a lowering price is the result of 
declining demand or a deviation by another algorithm.148 
After examining a number of experimental studies, Professor Ai 
Deng concluded that “to design an algorithm that has some  
degree of a guaranteed success in eliciting tacit collusion, the  
capability to collude most likely needs to be an explicit design fea-
ture.”149 If that is the case, and collusion is coded explicitly into the 
algorithm, then agencies and courts can address this actual, rather 
than theoretical, algorithmic collusion problem by adopting Gal’s 
approach.150 Particularly, the authorities can consider Gal’s pro-
 
141 Ai Deng, What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion?, 33 ANTITRUST 88, 
89 (Fall 2018). 
142 Id. at 90. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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148 Id. 
149 Id. at 90–91. 
150 See Gal, supra note 10, at 77; see also supra Part I.E. 
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posed “plus factors” from which an agreement to collude can be in-
ferred.151 Because algorithmic parallel pricing has never been chal-
lenged in court, we have yet to see whether courts will consider 
Gal’s proposed “plus factors” as evidence of a tacit agreement to fix 
prices. Nevertheless, as discussed above, Gal’s “plus factors” fit 
well into the body of established case law that permits the inference 
of “agreement” from similar facilitating practices, albeit without an 
algorithmic spin.152 There is no reason to suspect that such an algo-
rithmic wrinkle would discourage the Supreme Court from applying 
its well-established legal framework to the digital market economy. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apple Inc. v. 
Pepper indicates that it will not tolerate firms’ attempts to evade an-
titrust claims by employing new arrangements in the digital mar-
kets.153 The Apple case addressed unilateral anticompetitive con-
duct, which is captured under Section Two of the Sherman Act.154 
In Apple, purchasers of smartphone applications (“apps”) created by 
independent developers claimed that Apple imposed inflated com-
missions on the developers who, in turn, were forced to set high 
prices for their apps.155 In rejecting Apple’s argument that under Il-
linois Brick Co. v. Illinois,156 purchasers of third-parties’ apps in the 
App Store had no standing to sue Apple because app developers, 
rather than Apple, set the retail price, the Court explained that “Ap-
ple’s theory would provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers to 
structure transactions with manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade 
antitrust claims by consumers and thereby thwart effective antitrust 
enforcement.”157 Conferring standing on the app purchasers, the 
Court declined to “create an unprincipled and economically sense-
less distinction among monopolistic retailers, and furnish mono-
 
151 See Gal, supra note 10, at 101. 
152 See id. at 103. 
153 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1522–23 (2019). 
154 Id. at 1525. 
155 See id. at 1519. 
156 See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that indirect 
purchasers of products lacked standing to bring antitrust challenges against producers of 
such products). 
157 Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1523. 
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polistic retailers with a how-to guide for evasion of the antitrust 
laws.”158 
The Court’s reasoning in Apple suggests that it would be unwill-
ing to entertain claims that business behavior which has long been 
regarded as indirect evidence of tacit “agreement” should not be 
considered as unlawful collusion only because it is facilitated by al-
gorithms. Otherwise, the firms would receive “a how-to guide” for 
conspiring via algorithms to fix prices with immunity, the immunity 
that the Court declined to provide in Apple.159 Ultimately, the only 
way to find out whether courts would be willing to recognize certain 
algorithmic features and the circumstances under which such fea-
tures are adopted as “plus factors” that warrant an inference of 
“agreement” is to actually litigate such cases. Therefore, this Note 
focuses on solving the preliminary problem: helping authorities  
detect algorithmic cartels so the government can bring cases chal-
lenging these cartels. 
II. DETECTION OF ALGORITHMIC CARTELS 
A. Challenges in Detecting Algorithmic Cartels 
Algorithmic cartels are more challenging to detect than regular 
price-fixing schemes in part because traditional structural and be-
havioral approaches to cartels’ screening can often be ineffective for 
algorithmic cartel detection. Involving the identification of markets 
and products that are vulnerable to collusion and cartel formation,160 
the structural approach can easily miss the firms that—while being 
outside of the traditional “oligopoly problem”—managed to create 
algorithmic cartels due to data transparency in the digital world.161 
 
158 Id. at 1524. 
159 See id. at 1524–25. 
160 “[I]t has been shown that structurally, cartel formation is more likely to exist where 
there are fewer firms, more homogeneous products, and more stable demand.” Joseph E. 
Harrington, Jr., Detecting Cartels 1 (JOHNS HOPKINS U., DEP’T OF ECON., Working Paper 
No. 526, 2005), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/72037/1/504388991.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XDE4-VFMS]. 
161 See OECD, supra note 21, at 21; see also Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790 
(explaining that in the digital world, a basic condition for tacit collusion/conscious 
parallelism is easily accomplished); Noethlich, supra note 67, at 952 (“All digital markets, 
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Meanwhile, the behavioral approach that entails flagging business 
conduct and market outcomes indicative of a cartel’s existence may 
also prove ineffective because algorithms can help cartels eliminate 
suspicious behavior (such as temporary price wars and sudden price 
collapses at the end of cartels) that might have otherwise placed 
them on the radar of the authorities.162 Furthermore, algorithms’ 
ability to stabilize a cartel enables its members to respond quickly 
to an individual firm’s attempt to cheat on its fellow cartelists.163 
Every cartel faces this so-called prisoner’s dilemma,164 which 
entails the risk that its members will start deviating from the price-
fixing scheme to gain market share.165 To illustrate, imagine that the 
market price of a product is ten dollars and that a cartel’s members 
all agree to charge an inflated price of twenty dollars.166 While the 
parties are all better off complying with the agreement, it can be hard 
for a cartelist to resist a powerful temptation to cheat and charge 
fifteen dollars to increase its market share by winning over its com-
petitors’ customers.167 Such temptation can be curtailed only by a 
high probability that other members of the cartel will detect cheating 
 
even those outside the traditional oligopoly problem,” are “vulnerable to vast manipulation 
and anticompetitive outcomes.”). 
162 See DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., SUMMARY OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON CARTEL SCREENING IN THE DIGITAL ERA 3 (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2018)3/en/pdf [http://perma.cc/WFF6-
9TYW] [hereinafter DIRECTORATE]. 
163 Noethlich, supra note 67, at 933–34. 
164 Id. at 933. The prisoner’s dilemma game theory illustrates self-destructive tendency 
of cartels’ dynamics. Id. The game can be illustrated with two prisoners (A and B) who 
have been charged with a crime. Melamed, supra note 77, at 214–215. Neither of them 
knows whether the other would confess or keep silent because they are kept in separate 
cells. Id. If prisoner A keeps quiet it will go free only if B stays silent as well; if A keeps 
quiet while B confesses, A would get maximum sentence of 10 years; if A confesses while 
B stays silent, A would get a reduced sentence; if both prisoners confess, they both get 
reduction in their sentences. Id. Obviously A and B are better off not confessing, but, since 
none of them knows what another would do, the safest bet is to confess. Id. The prisoner’s 
dilemma demonstrates that individually rational behavior in the absence of coordination 
leads to an outcome that is worse for each person. Id. 
165 Noethlich, supra note 67, at 933–34. 
166 See Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, The Implications of Algorithmic Pricing for 
Coordinated Effects Analysis and Price Discrimination Markets in Antitrust Enforcement, 
32 ANTITRUST ABA 75, 75 (2017). 
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quickly and retaliate by lowering their prices.168 The more quickly 
other members of the cartel respond to any deviation from the com-
mon plan, the less likely the cartelist would try to stray off course.169 
Therein lies the value that algorithms bring to this context: they  
enable firms not only respond to cheating faster but also with more 
accuracy and less expenditure.170 With precision and speed unattain-
able by any human, algorithms process competitors’ prices, prowl 
databases, analyze all collected information, and arrive at pricing 
solutions within milliseconds.171 However, such speed in managing 
algorithmic cartels heightens the detection problem for authorities, 
as it can drastically eliminate the possibility that the cartels will ever 
get on the radar of the authorities. 
Moreover, the mere fact that algorithms can immediately flag 
any deviation from a common scheme is likely to prevent cartel 
members from any attempt to cheat in the first place.172 The ability 
of algorithms to track and quickly flag cartel members’ price 
changes eliminates a lack of trust among cartelists, which is often a 
reason behind cartels’ demise.173 Algorithms, which are computer 
programs after all, are not subject to human vices—such as fear, dis-
trust, and greed—and can therefore render the effect of the cartel’s 
prisoner’s dilemma obsolete; free of this dilemma, cartels can oper-
ate without ever being detected.174 
Further, because the use of algorithms allows cartels to execute 
their illegal schemes while leaving minimal evidence, it diminishes 
the likelihood of detection.175 After agreeing to fix prices via algo-
rithm, co-conspirators do not need to speak to their fellow cartelists 
 
168 See id. 
169 Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 7.2 (2010), http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4HFL-HR6A] (specifying that speed in identifying and responding to competitors’ 
strategic initiatives renders markets more vulnerable to coordinated conduct). 
170 McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 166, at 76. 
171 See supra Part I.A. 
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173 Id. 
174 Id. at 941. 
175 David J. Lynch, Policing the Digital Cartels, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9de9fb80-cd23-11e6-864f-20dcb35cede2 
[https://perma.cc/5PM7-BJWN] (subscription required). 
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ever again, either in person, on the phone, or via email.176 Rather, 
the cartelists can conveniently rely on algorithms to perform all the 
aspects of their price-fixing scheme without leaving behind trails of 
traditional incriminating evidence.177 Critically, the evidence of an 
illegal scheme that can be uncovered by examining an algorithm it-
self is not easy to access or analyze.178 There are two kinds of access 
to algorithms’ codes that the authorities can gain: black box and 
white box.179 Black box access does not allow the authorities to ex-
amine the code itself; it only provides access to the algorithm’s out-
put.180 Meanwhile, white box access enables the authorities to ex-
amine the algorithmic code.181 However, companies may be unwill-
ing to provide access to their codes due to potential infringement 
exposure of their algorithmic trade secrets.182 
Another challenge that can affect the authorities’ ability to dis-
cover evidence of price-fixing schemes by analyzing algorithms is 
access to data used by algorithms.183 The importance of such access 
is twofold: it allows the authorities to discern algorithmic decision-
making and perform repeatability analysis.184 Repeatability is an 
empirical-science tool that the authorities can use to verify whether 
a specific outcome was, in fact, caused by the algorithm.185 Specifi-
cally, repeatability analyzes the “closeness of the agreement  
between the results of successive measurements of the same meas-
ure and carried out under the same conditions of measurement.”186 
In other words, the authorities, having procured the data used by a 
suspect algorithm, can run this data under the same conditions on 
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the same algorithmic code (if available) or a similar publicly acces-
sible algorithm in order to see whether it produces the same inflated 
prices that sparked the authorities’ interest.187 
While repeatability provides a “sanity check,” it still leaves the 
authorities with questions regarding the actual decision-making of 
the algorithm.188 Where algorithmic decision-making is exposed 
through, for example, a decision tree that reveals the factors that an 
algorithm used in reaching its decision,189 the authorities can deter-
mine whether the factors used raise antitrust concerns.190 For in-
stance, the enforcers may be concerned with a gas station’s algo-
rithm that uses the color of the flag of a neighboring gas station—
which may be a covert channel for collusion—as a factor for deter-
mining its gasoline prices.191 However, an algorithm’s use of traffic 
and weather conditions to set gasoline prices would not raise anti-
trust concerns.192 Where such factors are unclear or an algorithm is 
unavailable, the access to data used by an algorithm can enable the 
authorities to use publicly available algorithms to re-create the out-
comes yielded by the algorithm at issue and discern the factors it 
used.193 Moreover, such an indirect exposure of real-world algorith-
mic decision-making requires familiarity with state-of-the-art algo-
rithms.194 Certainly, the necessary know-how can be provided by 
experts that the DOJ commonly hires to prove price-fixing conspir-
acies in courts.195 However, in order to open an investigation that 
warrants hiring such experts, the DOJ has to detect suspicious algo-
rithmic activities in the first place. 
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B. Leniency Program Is Not a Panacea for Cartel Detection 
The Leniency Program (“the Program”), first introduced in 
1978, has become the backbone of the DOJ’s cartel detection and 
enforcement.196 Today, the Program provides corporations and indi-
viduals that come forward with information about their cartels an 
opportunity to avoid a criminal conviction and fines.197 To be qual-
ified for leniency, an entity must (1) be the first among the cartel 
members to come forward,198 (2) stop its own participation in the 
cartel, (3) fully admit to its role in the conspiracy, (4) identify its co-
conspirators, (5) make restitution where possible,199 and (6) cooper-
ate fully with the DOJ.200 If the Division has not already started its 
own investigation into the reported cartel, leniency is automatic for 
qualified companies and individuals.201 Additionally, leniency can 
still be available after the commencement of the investigation if the 
 
196 See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust 
Div., Presentation at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime: The 
Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades 2–3, (Feb. 25, 
2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download [https://perma.cc/527K-KEYQ]. 
197 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the 
Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters 1 (Nov. 18, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/810001/download [https://perma.cc/435V-49RK]. For a 
brief history of the Division’s Leniency Program, see Constance K. Robinson & Kilpatrick 
Stockton, Get-Out-Of-Jail-Free Cards: Amnesty Developments in the United States and 
Current Issues, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 29, 30–33 (2007). 
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executives.”). 
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CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., June 2019, at 1, 2, https://www.competition
policyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CPI-Hollywood-Rochelson.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JKD3-HS53] (subscription required). 
200 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 10, 1993), 
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DOJ does not have enough information that is likely to result in con-
viction.202 
The Leniency Program has been extremely successful, resulting 
in the detection and conviction of major international price-fixing 
cartels, billions of dollars in fines, and incarceration of cartel mem-
bers.203 Between 2005 and 2010, ninety percent of all fines recov-
ered from cartels were tied to the participation of leniency appli-
cants.204 More than half of the DOJ’s ongoing international cartel 
investigations are initiated or otherwise advanced by information 
from leniency applicants.205 The Leniency Program is an effective 
tool in cartel detection because it destabilizes cartels by creating a 
race among conspirators to the prosecutor’s door to be the first to 
confess.206 Each cartelist knows that it can report others in exchange 
for full immunity. Accordingly, a firm is left wondering whether it 
can trust its fellow cartelists, who happen to be its business compet-
itors, to look out for the firm’s best interests.207 
Nevertheless, even with the Leniency Program in place, some 
estimates suggest that the DOJ is only aware of approximately ten 
to seventeen percent of price-fixing cartels currently active.208 For 
instance, professors Peter G. Bryant and Edwin Eckard, using data 
from 184 convictions secured by the Antitrust Division between 
1961 and 1988, have estimated that the probability of cartel  
detection is between thirteen and seventeen percent.209 Professors  
Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier, and Renaud Legal found, 
based on the data of eighty-six convictions handed down by the Eu-
ropean Commission between 1969 and 2007, that the probability of 
cartel detection is approximately thirteen percent.210 Because the 
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findings are based on the data of detected cartels, “they only repre-
sent the probability of a cartel being detected conditional on that 
cartel being detectable.”211 The actual probability of cartel  
detection is unknown and likely to be even lower than the paltry 
aforementioned estimates.212 
Based on the low rate of cartel detection, it is safe to assume that 
even with the Leniency Program in place, the vast majority of cartels 
go unpunished. This reality speaks to certain key challenges facing 
the Leniency Program. Most important among these is how even 
cartelists that want to get out of their illegal schemes may forgo self-
reporting for a number of reasons.213 First, the Leniency Program 
does not provide immunity from criminal exposure beyond the Sher-
man Act.214 A corporation that engaged in fraud along with price-
fixing would still be on the hook for its fraudulent actions.215 Sec-
ond, after receiving leniency, a company remains exposed to civil 
liability and the fines that come with it.216 Further, cooperation with 
the DOJ, which can last for years, requires a significant investment 
of time and resources.217 In fact, many observers argue that leniency 
applications are slowing down because of the cost of obtaining 
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leniency, which includes attorney fees, corporate time, and the real-
ity that, in an expanding universe of jurisdictions, the U.S. leniency 
applicants have to self-report in all the countries impacted by their  
illegal scheme.218 
Thus, even without the challenge of detecting algorithmic car-
tels, the Leniency Program, while undoubtedly effective to a limited 
extent, is not a panacea even for the detection of regular cartels. The 
Program will likely prove even less effective in combating algorith-
mic cartels in light of their ability to stabilize a cartel’s operations 
by eliminating the prisoner’s dilemma.219 
C. Solution #1: Screening for Algorithmic Cartels 
Ezrachi and Stucke propose to screen the digital markets for col-
lusion.220 According to these scholars, agencies may “evaluate com-
puterized market environments” and—if prices become unrespon-
sive to costs or more tightly clustered across companies—“require 
companies to reveal the nature of their algorithms to ascertain 
whether these algorithms create excessive transparency or lead  
to interdependence.”221 
To better understand what factors are indicative of algorithmic 
collusion and, therefore, worth exploring further, Ezrachi and 
Stucke encourage enforcers to begin commissioning or internally 
conducting experimental research of pricing algorithms.222 As part 
of such research, a regulatory agency would examine the available 
pricing algorithms and run simulations in a collusion incubator.223 
The agency could test which conditions, when included or excluded 
from the incubator, would raise the likelihood and longevity of col-
lusion.224 Ezrachi and Stucke admit that such an incubator is far 
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from perfect because it is relatively static and will not reflect 
changes in market dynamics over time and alteration to algorithms 
through, for example, human intervention.225 Nevertheless, accord-
ing to Ezrachi and Stucke, such experimental research will help 
identify which algorithmic features raise red flags and warrant fur-
ther investigation.226 Such selective intervention, Ezrachi and 
Stucke argue, “may have more limited cost implications” than ran-
dom screening and “may also limit the possible adverse effects on 
innovation and investment, as it is only after tacit collusion is de-
tected that the market is subjected to a monitoring exercise.”227 
Professor Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and Managing Director at 
Moody’s Investor Services, Albert D. Metz, go a step further by pro-
posing that the authorities use algorithms to screen for digital cartels 
and other collusive, anti-competitive practices.228 Abrantes-Metz 
and Metz explain that the successful detection of digital collusion 
requires prediction or classification functions that algorithms per-
form seamlessly, and which are the very same functions that make 
algorithms so attractive to cartels in the first place.229 The pair 
acknowledges that simply asking algorithms to identify illegal col-
lusion would be hopeless because lawful tacit collusion can be vir-
tually indistinguishable from unlawful explicit collusion.230 Never-
theless, according to them, enforcers can train algorithms to identify 
prices that are either unresponsive to costs or tightly clustered across 
rival firms.231 After such red flags are raised, economists and com-
putational experts would further analyze the algorithms at issue and 
data used by them.232 Abrantes-Metz and Metz emphasize the im-
portance of economists in the process because “an empirical ap-
proach to cartel detection is not only a prediction or classification 
problem: there is usually a testing component.”233 The pair explains 
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that, for effective cartel detection, it is paramount to formulate a hy-
pothesis to be tested: “how likely is it that the observed data were 
generated from a collusive rather than a competitive dynamic?”234 
As Abrantes-Metz and Metz note, economists have the necessary 
expertise to perform statistical testing and make the determination 
regarding the likelihood of one hypothesis over an alternate.235 
To illustrate how economists can use algorithms to identify col-
lusion, Abrantes-Metz and Metz provide an example of the work 
that they performed “almost two decades ago . . . with [a] compli-
ance department of [one] company.”236 Their task was “to identify 
which managers [in the company] were colluding to boost [their] 
performance evaluations.”237 The suspicion was that conspiring 
managers had agreed to boost the scores they assigned among them-
selves while depressing the evaluations of others.238 Having the 
anonymized evaluation scores and other relevant data, such as prac-
tice areas and locations, the economists used “a clustering algorithm 
to run over all possible combinations to find groups which mini-
mized differences within and maximized differences with-
out . . . .”239 Ultimately, the economists “identified exactly the [] 
managers [that] were suspected of colluding and the year [they had] 
started” to do so.240 
The possibility of using algorithms to screen for collusion is also 
addressed in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and  
Development’s (“OECD”) report.241 According to the OECD, a 
number of competition agencies have already reported using  
algorithms to detect bid-rigging by screening for anomalies and  
suspicious bidding patterns.242 For instance, algorithmic screening 
enabled the Korea Fair Trade Commission to detect several  
bid-rigging conspiracies.243 These efforts and successes point to the 
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promise of screening as a solution to enhancing the detection of  
algorithmic cartels. 
D. Solution #2: Antitrust Bounty Statute 
Given that the Leniency Program is hardly effective at detecting 
conventional cartels, scholars and practitioners have been advocat-
ing for the passage of an antitrust whistleblower statute since long 
before algorithmic cartels have emerged on the scene.244 Specifi-
cally, Robert Connolly and Kimberly Justice, former prosecutors at 
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, have argued that a statute that pro-
vides antitrust whistleblowers with financial rewards (bounty) will 
add an additional tool to help the Department detect cartels.245 
Connolly and Justice explain that “the cartel whistleblower cal-
culus currently is all trouble, no reward”: whistleblowers receive 
neither bounty nor protection from employment retaliation.246 Even 
if a potential whistleblower did not participate in a cartel, but learned 
about its existence by, for example, overhearing conversations of 
their coworkers, they may often decide to look the other way.247 Oth-
erwise, they may face the risk of losing their job, spending their sav-
ings on attorney fees, and being blacklisted from the industry.248 If 
low-level employees—following their superior’s orders—get  
involved in a cartel’s activities, their decision to report the cartel 
would involve additional hurdles of applying for leniency and coop-
erating with the DOJ.249 The fact that the Individual Leniency Policy 
is almost never used suggests that rational individuals are more 
likely to forgo reporting rather than exposing themselves to all of 
 
244 See generally William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: 
Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 768–69 (2001) (arguing 
for the extension of the corporate leniency program by giving rewards to individuals who 
provide information about cartels); see also Jonathan Wright, Blow the Whistle: How 
Bringing Whistleblower Rewards to antitrust Would Help Cartel Enforcement, 3 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 695 (2017); Robert Connolly & Kimberly Justice, It’s a Crime There Isn’t an 
Antitrust Whistleblower Statute, ANTITRUST L. DAILY 1 (Apr. 8, 2018), 
http://business.cch.com/ald/ALD_Criminal-Antitrust-Whistleblower-Statute_04-05-
2018_final_locked.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NGC-W84C]. 
245 Connolly & Justice, supra note 244, at 3. 
246 Id. at 2. 
247 Id. 
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249 Id. 
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the aforementioned risks.250 Therefore, providing whistleblowers 
with a bounty, according to Connolly and Justice, can mitigate the 
risks that whistleblowers face and, ultimately, incentivize them to 
come forward.251 Moreover, Connolly notes that the bounty statute 
would not only improve the detection rate of cartels but would also 
destabilize them.252 The mere possibility that a whistleblower is able 
to receive a reward for reporting a cartel might destabilize the cartel 
or prevent its formation in the first place.253 
Proponents of an antitrust whistleblower statute point to the suc-
cess of the nation’s most renowned whistleblower system: the False 
Claims Act’s (“FCA”) whistleblower provision.254 The FCA im-
poses civil liability for anyone who knowingly defrauds the govern-
ment and permits the DOJ to recover treble damages.255 The Act 
includes a qui tam provision that allows whistleblowers, who are not 
affiliated with the government, to file an action on behalf of the gov-
ernment.256 The FCA provides standing for individuals who have 
direct and independent knowledge regarding fraudulent activities 
and have voluntarily shared the information with the government 
before filing an action.257 If the DOJ decides to intervene, the whis-
tleblowers receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the 
money the DOJ recovers.258 If the DOJ does not join and bring the 
suit themselves, the whistleblowers are still free to proceed on their 
own and collect between twenty-five and thirty percent of the 
amount recovered.259 Furthermore, under the FCA, whistleblowers 
enjoy protections against retaliation, including a private right of  
 
250 Connolly, supra note 217. 
251 Connolly & Justice, supra note 244, at 2. 
252 Id. 
253 Connolly, supra note 217. 
254 See Connolly & Justice, supra note 244. 
255 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. § 3730(e). 
258 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., The False Claims Act: A Primer (Apr. 22, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-
FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/WLJ7-VQ2S]. 
259 Id. 
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action.260 Since the mid-1980s, the government has recovered  
$27.2 billion from claims brought by whistleblowers under  
the FCA.261 
Advocates of an antitrust bounty statute use the success of the 
FCA qui tam provision as an exemplar that whistleblowing 
works.262 However, there is a consensus that an antitrust whistle-
blower statute cannot be modeled after the FCA qui tam provision 
because the “DOJ has the sole authority to prosecute federal crimi-
nal cases, so a private right of action in the criminal context would 
conflict with this authority.”263 Because a private party cannot bring 
a criminal claim on behalf of a government, Connolly and Justice 
believe that an antitrust bounty statute should be similar to the one 
that the SEC currently has.264 
The SEC whistleblower program emerged after Congress passed 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“the Dodd–Frank Act”) in 2010.265 The SEC whistleblower provi-
sion provides an informant with a reward for disclosing violations, 
such as insider trading and fraudulent reporting.266 The SEC rewards 
program is triggered only in cases where the SEC’s monetary sanc-
tions exceed $1 million.267 When this threshold is met, a whistle-
blower receives no less than ten percent and no more than thirty per-
cent of a total recovery.268 However, to be eligible for a bounty, a 
 
260 Memorandum from the U.S. Att’y Off. of the E.D. Pa. on False Claims Act Cases, 
U.S. Dep’t of Just. (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
edpa/legacy/2011/04/18/fcaprocess2_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2QZ-SUNW]. 
261 Id. 
262 Connolly & Justice, supra note 244. 
263 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CRIMINAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: 
STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON IMPACT OF 2004 ANTITRUST REFORM ARE MIXED, BUT SUPPORT 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 38 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321794.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BXM7-7ARC] [hereinafter STAKEHOLDER VIEWS]. 
264 Connolly & Justice, supra note 244. 
265 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2016); Samuel C. Leifer, Note, Protecting Whistleblower Protections 
in the Dodd–Frank Act, 113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (2014). 
266 See Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd–Frank Act’s Robust Whistleblowing Incentives, 
FORBES (Apr. 14, 2011, 9:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/04/
14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robustwhistleblowing- 
incentives/#596000991193 [https://perma.cc/2M3S-RPSQ]. 
267 Id. 
268 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010). 
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whistleblower cannot be “convicted of a criminal violation related 
to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower 
otherwise could receive an award.”269 When determining the 
amount of a bounty, the SEC considers the significance of the infor-
mation shared, the degree of assistance provided by the informant, 
and the importance of deterring the specific violation at issue.270  
Besides a monetary award, the SEC whistleblower statute provides 
informants with anti-retaliation protections, including anonymity 
and a private right of action.271 The SEC whistleblower program has 
been an undeniable success: from its inception to the end of Fiscal 
Year 2019, 67 whistleblowers received approximately $387 million 
for cooperating with the SEC.272 On the whole, whistleblowers’  
tips have helped the SEC to recover more than $2 billion in  
financial remedies.273 
In spite of the SEC whistleblower program’s success, Congress 
has failed to provide antitrust whistleblowers even with minimal job 
retaliation protection.274 In 2011, the Government Accountability 
Office issued a report (“the Report”) on Criminal Cartel Enforce-
ment recommending that Congress enact protections for whistle-
blowers who report criminal antitrust violations.275 This Report em-
phasized the consensus among key stakeholders that whistleblowers 
should be protected from retaliation.276 Although the Report noted 
that some stakeholders believed that a whistleblower reward would 
be an effective additional tool in detecting and destabilizing cartels, 
the Report found that there was no consensus on the issue and that 
 
269 Id. § 78u–6. 
270 Kerschberg, supra note 266. 
271 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6. 
272 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2019-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FVN-K4UC]. 
273 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WHISTLEBLOWER AWARDS FOR TIPS RESULTING IN 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower-
100million [https://perma.cc/5VUS-JX7X]. 
274 Robert Connolly, It Is Time for an Antitrust Whistleblower Statute—Part 2, CARTEL 
CAPERS (Nov. 14, 2017), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/time-antitrust-whistleblower-
statute-part-2 [https://perma.cc/3JHC-JYW2]. 
275 See STAKEHOLDER VIEWS, supra note 263, at 36–37. 
276 See id. 
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the DOJ was opposed to the idea.277 Relying on this Report, Senators 
Chuck Grassley (Republican) and Patrick Leahy (Democrat) intro-
duced the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act (“the Act”) in 
2012, which would have provided whistleblowers with protection 
from workplace retaliation.278 The Senate unanimously passed sim-
ilar versions of this legislation in 2013,279 2015,280 2017,281 and 
2019.282 However, on all four occasions, the House failed to take up 
the bill.283 In light of the Senate’s bipartisan support of the Act, ob-
servers patiently wait for the House to take up the bill.284 Mean-
while, because the Report documented the lack of consensus among 
stakeholders—including the DOJ—regarding a whistleblower re-
ward, this issue has never made it to the language of the Act.285 
The DOJ’s main concern with a whistleblower reward statute  
is that jurors will not perceive whistleblowers—who will be  
rewarded from the successful prosecution of those they implicate—
as credible.286 The DOJ points out that, although leniency applicants 
receive amnesty, their credibility is somewhat maintained because 
they have to admit their criminal wrongdoing.287 The Antitrust Di-
vision notes that concerns regarding witness credibility are espe-
cially emphatic in the criminal context, where the government has 
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.288 According to the De-
partment, although ninety percent of the cartel enforcement cases 
 
277 See id. 
278 Mark L. Krotoski & Bernard W. Archbold, US Senate Passed Criminal Antitrust Anti-
Retaliation Act, MORGAN LEWIS (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/us-
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279 S. 42, 113th Cong. (2013). 
280 S. 1599, 114th Cong. (2015). 
281 S. 807, 115th Cong. (2017). 
282 S. 2258, 116th Cong. (2019). 
283 Connolly, supra note 274; see All Information (Except Text) for S.2258—Criminal 
Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2019, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
116th-congress/senate-bill/2258/all-info [https://perma.cc/RR7L-8GCA]. 
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are settled by plea agreements, in the ten percent of the cases that go 
to trial, the Department virtually always utilizes the leniency appli-
cants’ testimony.289 Also, the DOJ is concerned with the possibility 
that a whistleblower reward can undermine companies’ internal 
compliance programs.290 
Connolly and Justice argue that all of the aforementioned  
arguments “are really quite weak.”291 The pair points out that “it is 
not logical to worry about the credibility of witnesses you would 
otherwise not even know about absent a whistleblower statute.”292 
Further, Connolly explains that an antitrust crime typically  
involves many culpable actors and a whistleblower would generally 
“get the ball rolling” and provide evidence that will turn other wit-
nesses and allow the Department to obtain subpoenas and search 
warrants.293 As to those rare cases that do go to trial, a whistleblower 
who stands to receive a financial reward does not seem that much 
less credible than a leniency applicant who testifies against other 
cartel members to gain amnesty.294 Arguably, the fear of one’s loss 
of liberty via incarceration is a stronger motivator than pecuniary 
gain; therefore, there is an argument that bounty recipients might be 
even more credible than leniency applicants in this context. 
Also, while the concern that a whistleblower reward could  
undermine companies’ internal compliance program “seems more 
legitimate,” it can hardly be dispositive.295 Connolly and Justice  
explain that the Division would still be able to approach a company 
with a credible compliance program and seek to negotiate a leniency 
application, i.e., so-called affirmative leniency.296 Alternatively,  
a truly comprehensive compliance program can be taken into  
consideration by the DOJ at the charging and sentencing stage.297 
Furthermore, Connolly and Justice argue that if cartels are getting 
 
289 See id. at 40. 
290 Id. at 42. 
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exposed by employees who decide to knock on the door of a prose-
cutor rather than a compliance officer, the balance of equities favors 
detecting cartels and stopping damaging price-fixing schemes from 
harming consumers.298 
Other advocates for an antitrust bounty statute note that the stat-
ute can have a similar provision to the one contained in the Dodd–
Frank Act, which requires whistleblowers from public companies 
with robust compliance programs to also report illegal conduct  
internally without stripping the whistleblowers of their reward.299 In 
fact, a key goal of the Dodd–Frank Act—which has largely been 
achieved—was to use the SEC whistleblower system itself to incen-
tivize the widespread adoption of robust compliance programs by 
public corporations.300 This suggests that a strong internal compli-
ance system will not be affected by a whistleblower bounty statute, 
as the two aspects of the enforcement scheme work well together, 
rather than being mutually exclusive. 
Connolly and Justice also argue that a widespread concern that 
a bounty statute will enable a mastermind cartel to receive a finan-
cial reward is detached from reality.301 They explain that an antitrust 
bounty statute would include the provision, similar to the one the 
SEC has, that denies a bounty for those who have been convicted  
of a criminal violation that they themselves reported.302  
Accordingly, to receive a bounty, every potential whistleblower 
with some criminal exposure would first have to obtain immunity 
under the Leniency Program.303 During the leniency negotiations, 
the DOJ would decide whether an informant is eligible only for  
 
298 See Connolly & Justice, supra note 244. 
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leniency, a whistleblower bounty, or for both.304 The necessity of 
first seeking immunity would ensure that the Antitrust Division re-
tains significant control over the decision whether a whistleblower 
is eligible for a reward.305 Moreover, according to Connolly and Jus-
tice, a whistleblower bounty would be an amount to be  
determined.306 Hence, the DOJ would be able to reduce a bounty 
based on a whistleblower’s involvement in the cartel.307 
Connolly and Justice argue that rewarding low-level employ-
ees—given the risks and expenses they face providing valuable in-
formation—is a reasonable exchange.308 Under conspiracy law, 
low-level employees are liable for the actions of a cartel if they take 
a single act in furtherance of the illegal scheme while aware of its 
existence.309 Thus, salespeople who know that their company is in-
volved in a price-fixing scheme are liable as conspirators if they pre-
pare a single bid that is a part of the scheme.310 In fact, low-level 
employees are usually the ones who communicate with  
competitors, attend meetings, and oversee the implementation of the 
cartel.311 An employee with such first-hand knowledge of the car-
tel’s inner workings can be an effective whistleblower, and the DOJ-
—according to Connolly and Justice—would still have plenty of 
cartel members to prosecute.312 
III. ASSESSING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: THE BEST SOLUTION IS TO 
IMPLEMENT THE WHISTLEBLOWER BOUNTY PROGRAM BEFORE 
CARTEL SCREENING 
These solutions—cartel screening and the whistleblower bounty 
program—are not mutually exclusive. Their implementation can en-
able the DOJ to target algorithmic cartels both proactively (with car-
tel screening) and reactively (with the whistleblower bounty 
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program). Furthermore, both solutions can complement each other 
and work in unison with the existing Leniency Program. After red 
flags are raised by cartel screening, the DOJ’s investigation into a 
particular firm may trigger either the firm’s leniency application or 
a whistleblower coming forward with information necessary for 
conviction. The Department would retain significant discretion in 
deciding which of the two options are more appropriate, depending 
on the culpability of actors involved, the timing of the disclosure, 
and the likelihood of a successful conviction without cooperation 
from leniency applicants or whistleblowers. Implementing both so-
lutions, the antitrust authorities would be able to address the chal-
lenging task of detecting algorithmic and regular cartels. Although 
the optimal solution is to implement cartel screening and the whis-
tleblower bounty program together, it would be more effective and 
efficient to implement the latter before the former. 
Such an order of implementation would be cost-effective  
because it can eliminate the need for Ezrachi and Stucke’s proposed 
research program. This research—aimed at determining algorithmic 
features and the digital markets environment that raise red flags—
would be necessary313 because traditional structural and behavioral 
approaches to screening are inadequate for the effective detection of 
algorithmic cartels.314 However, the whistleblower bounty program 
can alleviate the need for this research because whistleblowers such 
as algorithms’ developers, programmers, and computer techni-
cians—who monitor algorithms on a daily basis—would be able  
to provide the authorities with valuable insight into algorithmic  
features that lead to collusion. Over time, by investigating cases of 
algorithmic cartels uncovered by whistleblowers, governmental 
agencies will acquire the necessary expertise on the issue. Because 
such expertise would be gained in practice—accounting for the real-
time market conditions—it will ensure more accuracy in these agen-
cies’ decisions to bring a legal challenge and therefore would elim-
inate the risk of targeting benign algorithmic practices, depressing 
innovation, and wasting resources. 
 
313 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 120, at 28. 
314 See OECD, supra note 21, at 24; see also DIRECTORATE, supra note 162, at 3. 
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Because antitrust whistleblowers’ eligibility for a reward will be 
conditioned on a successful conviction, there is a guarantee that the 
costs of providing the reward will be offset by the criminal fines.315 
Also, the whistleblower bounty program—which would generally 
require the DOJ to sit back and wait for “smoking gun” evidence to 
knock on the door—would not require extensive expenditure for its 
implementation. Conversely, the launch of cartel screening would 
entail substantial investment in Ezrachi and Stucke’s proposed re-
search program. For the program to be effective, computer scien-
tists, economists, and antitrust experts must work together, shadow 
the industry’s algorithms, and run different variations of algorithms 
in various simulated market conditions.316 All of this would be much 
more costly than simply paying those with existing knowledge  
to share it. 
Furthermore, the screening itself can impose considerable costs 
even if agencies use algorithms to screen for cartels. At the stage of 
initial screening, after agencies’ algorithms identify industries’ al-
gorithms that raise red flags, the authorities would be able to get 
only the black box access to suspect algorithms (unless firms’  
algorithmic codes are publicly accessible); therefore, the authorities 
would only have access to the algorithms’ output and, if lucky, the 
dataset used to generate it.317 To verify whether a specific outcome 
was caused by suspect algorithms, the authorities would have to  
invest in empirical scientists and economists to perform repeatabil-
ity analyses.318 After repeatability analyses, the antitrust enforcers 
would still have to investigate whether algorithmic decision-making 
is indicative of cartel existence. If an algorithmic decision tree is not 
readily available, the agencies would need to use publicly available 
algorithms to recreate the outcomes yielded by the algorithm at issue 
to discover the features it used.319 To do so, the agencies need to 
have familiarity with state-of-the-art algorithms that can help them 
 
315 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2004); see also Connolly, supra note 274. 
316 See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 120, at 28; see also Abrantes-Metz & Metz, supra 
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understand whether the algorithm’s decision-making took into ac-
count features that suggest the existence of a cartel.320 Yet, such 
know-how and technologies are not currently accessible to the DOJ 
or the FTC because the antitrust community is largely playing catch-
up on the technical aspects of algorithms.321 As described by the 
former FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen, “[t]he innerworkings of 
these tools are poorly understood by virtually everyone outside the 
narrow circle of technical experts that directly work in the field.”322 
Perhaps the biggest downside of implementing screening  
before the whistleblower bounty program is the risk that the  
authorities would be stuck wasting their time and resources on in-
vestigating benign cases of parallel pricing while letting disruptive 
algorithmic cartels slip through the cracks. Meanwhile, whistle-
blowers, assumed to be reasonable people, would neither waste the 
DOJ’s time nor risk perjuring themselves and facing criminal 
charges by bringing frivolous claims unless they are confident in the 
merits of their claims and the prospects of financial reward. 
Another reason why the implementation of the whistleblower 
bounty program is more urgent than cartel screening is the former’s 
ability to serve as an effective counterforce against cartels’ use of 
pricing algorithms to stabilize their operations. As Connolly notes, 
a mere possibility that a single member of a cartel can provide ac-
tionable information and receive a reward would significantly de-
stabilize the cartel.323 To the contrary, screening does not seem to 
provide the effect of destabilization that strikes at the heart of the 
cartel’s existence, i.e., the trust that it will not be exposed by its fel-
low cartelists or employees.324 The statement of fraud convict Sam 
E. Antar, former Crazy Eddie CFO, is illustrative: “In the two dec-
ades I was deeply involved in the Crazy Eddie fraud, the only threat 
[that] made us lose sleep at night was the possibility of a 
 
320 See Gal, supra note 178, at 6. 
321 Ai Deng, An Antitrust Lawyer’s Guide to Machine Learning, CARTEL CAPERS (Dec. 
6, 2017), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/antitrust-lawyers-guide-machine-learning-guest-
post-ai-deng-phd [https://perma.cc/QS8Q-VGZL]. 
322 Deng, supra note 23, at 82. 
323 Connolly, supra note 217. 
324 See Deng, supra note 141; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
1306        FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:1259 
 
whistleblower blowing the lid on our crimes.”325 Although screen-
ing efforts would certainly place algorithmic cartels on guard, it is 
unlikely that screening would either destabilize algorithmic cartels 
or make companies forgo engaging in price-fixing schemes alto-
gether. Rather, in light of the inherent obscurity of algorithms and 
the complexities of analyzing them, companies would still use algo-
rithms to fix prices: the firms would hope that they would not be 
detected or that they would still be able to prevail in courts (since 
the DOJ would only be able to present jurors with “plus factors” 
from which a conspiracy can be inferred).326 
While the use of algorithms to screen for cartels has already 
proven fruitful,327 the success of the SEC whistleblower program 
also suggests that a similar antitrust program would be effective in 
cartel detection.328 A high probability of success of the antitrust 
bounty statute is also supported by the recent work of the Antitrust 
Division with a qui tam whistleblower program.329 In November 
2018, the DOJ settled criminal ($82 million) and civil ($154 million) 
antitrust and qui tam claims against SK Energy Co. Ltd., GS Caltex 
Corporation, and Hanjin Transportation Co. Ltd.330 The qui tam 
whistleblower uncovered the bid-rigging scheme that the defendants 
orchestrated to secure military fuel-supply contracts from the gov-
ernment.331 The DOJ recovered both under the FCA for defrauding 
 
325 Robert Connolly, Whistleblowing and Criminal Antitrust Cartels: A Primer and Call 
for Reform, Cartel Capers (Dec. 12, 2019), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/whistleblowing-
and-criminal-antitrust-cartels-a-primer-and-call-for-reform [https://perma.cc/JZ8X-
MX28]; see also Henry Cutter, SEC Seeks Right to Cut Whistleblower Bounties, WALL ST. 
J. (June 29, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-proposes-whistleblower-
awards-for-smaller-cases-1530212390 [https://perma.cc/KA8V-JUWF]. 
326 See supra Part I.E; Part II.A. 
327 See Abrantes-Metz & Metz, supra note 228, at 3–4; OECD, supra note 21, at 14; see 
also supra Part II.C. 
328 See supra Part II.D; see also Connolly, supra note 274. 
329 See United States v. GS Caltex Corp., No. 18-1456, 2019 US Dist. LEXIS 125998, at 
*2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2019). 
330 Ross Brooks, Recent DOJ Settlement of Qui Tam and Antitrust Claims in Bid-Rigging 
Case Shows That an Additional Remedy Does Not Have to Be an Alternate Remedy, CASE 
TEXT (Jan. 9, 2019), https://casetext.com/analysis/recent-doj-settlement-of-qui-tam-and-
antitrust-claims-in-bid-rigging-case-shows-that-an-additional-remedy-does-not-have-to-
be-an-alternate-remedy [https://perma.cc/JK5P-ZFWK]. 
331 Id. 
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the government and under Section 4(A) of the Clayton Act,332 which 
amended the Sherman Act to provide injured parties the right to col-
lect their economic losses caused by the “anti-competitive effect” of 
the defendants’ actions.333 The fact that it was the qui tam whistle-
blower who uncovered the scheme that would have otherwise gone 
undetected illustrates the necessity of the antitrust bounty program. 
The antitrust whistleblower statute is needed precisely because the 
FCA’s qui tam action is unavailable in price-fixing schemes where 
the private sector and consumers, rather than the government,  
are damaged.334 
Another example that illustrates the effectiveness of rewarding 
whistleblowers for reporting violations of competition law is a cartel 
whistleblower program in South Korea. South Korea introduced its 
cartel whistleblower policy in 2002.335 The program has already led 
to convictions that would not have otherwise occurred336; and in 
early 2019, the program awarded the highest whistleblower reward 
to date (690 million Won, which is approximately $587,000) to an 
informant in a price-fixing case.337 Notably, the implementation of 
the whistleblower program coincided with the trend towards im-
proving South Korean companies’ internal compliance programs: an 
increasing number of companies are now offering anonymous whis-
tleblower hotlines.338 This trend suggests that whistleblowing 
 
332 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2004). 
333 See United States v. Beatrice Foods, 330 F. Supp. 577, 580 (D. Utah 1971) (noting 
that “[h]ad Congress in passing Section 4A [of the Clayton Act] intended to preclude 
application of the [FCA] to conduct also constituting an antitrust violation, it would not 
have been difficult, and it would be expected for it, to so indicate . . . .”). 
334 See Connolly, supra note 274. 
335 See Andreas Stephan, Is the Korean Innovation of Individual Informant Rewards  
a Viable Cartel Detection Tool? 1, 5 (ESRC Ctr. for Competition Pol’y, Working Paper  
No. 14–3, 2014), http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8199490/CCP+
Working+Paper+14-3.pdf/7a9c1d06-d790-4e83-86bf-d43c68c83d0d 
[https://perma.cc/F8DG-KGGD]. 
336 See id. 
337 Hee Won (Marina) Moon et al., Recent Developments in Anti-Corruption 
Enforcement in South Korea, WWL (Sept. 3, 2019), https://whoswholegal.com/features/
recent-developments-in-anti-corruption-enforcement-in-south-korea 
[https://perma.cc/YK2U-KARE]. 
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improves the private sector’s internal compliance initiatives rather 
than undermines them. 
Finally, it should be noted that, while the DOJ seems to be  
opposed to the whistleblower bounty statute, the rationale for such 
opposition is so “weak” that it might be a pretext, hinting at the 
DOJ’s caution in introducing any new tools to its Leniency Program 
that, while not perfect, still works.339 If that is the case, the Depart-
ment probably would also be opposed to the screening program if it 
is formally proposed and considered. However, this aversion to 
change is detached from reality because the whistleblower statute 
would not even change the Leniency Program, but rather would 
simply supply an additional tool to assist the DOJ in cartel detection 
and prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
Considering the low detection rate of cartels in general and the 
inherent obscurity of algorithmic cartels in particular, it is not sur-
prising that Topkins has been the only case involving algorithmic 
price-fixing prosecuted to date in the United States.340 The increased 
difficulty of detecting algorithmic cartels, as documented in this 
Note, can be effectively addressed by adopting the whistleblower 
and cartel screening programs. They can complement each other and 
work in unison with the DOJ’s existing Leniency Program, thereby 
increasing the detection rate of algorithmic cartels. 
However, after analyzing the proposed solutions, it becomes 
clear that governmental authorities should implement the whistle-
blower statute before they launch cartel screening. The value of this 
order of implementation lies in whistleblowers’ ability to “educate” 
the authorities about complex algorithmic features, which must be 
understood to perform cartel screening.341 Because whistleblowers 
 
339 See Connolly & Justice, supra note 244, at 2; see also Connolly, supra note 274. 
340 See Plea Agreement at 3–4, United States v. Topkins, No. 15-00201 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
30, 2015). 
341 Ezrachi and Stucke propose to screen the digital markets for collusion. To better 
understand what factors are indicative of algorithmic collusion and, therefore, worth 
exploring further, Ezrachi and Stucke encourage enforcers to begin commissioning or 
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such as algorithms’ developers, programmers, and computer techni-
cians monitor algorithms on a daily basis, they are well-equipped to 
provide the authorities with valuable information about algorithmic 
features that lead to collusion. Whistleblowers, presumptively rea-
sonable people, would come forward only if they are confident that 
their information would lead to a cartel detection and, therefore, a 
financial reward. Accordingly, by investigating cases of algorithmic 
cartels based on whistleblowers’ inside information, the authorities 
would gain the expertise necessary to perform cartel screening ac-
curately. Given the advantages that pricing algorithms have gener-
ated for businesses and consumers, it is essential to avoid the risk of 
targeting benign algorithmic practices, which would undermine 
technological development and the associated benefits that come 
with it.342 The whistleblower bounty program can achieve this deli-
cate task of enforcing antitrust laws without inhibiting innovation. 
Moreover, the program is an effective and efficient way to begin 
the “hunt” for algorithmic cartels. If properly advertised, the pro-
gram can start yielding results immediately after its introduction by 
incentivizing whistleblowers, who already are in possession of ac-
tionable information, to come forward. The program would not re-
quire extensive expenditures for its implementation; and, because a 
bounty will be contingent on a successful conviction, there is a guar-
antee that the costs of providing a whistleblower reward will be off-
set by criminal fines. Furthermore, having an informant with 
knowledge about the cartel would substantially eliminate the possi-
bility that the authorities would be wasting their time and resources 
investigating benign cases of parallel pricing. Finally, incentivizing 
cartels’ insiders to blow the whistle will serve as an effective coun-
terforce to cartels’ use of algorithms to stabilize their operations. 
Given that cartels remain “the supreme evil of antitrust”343 and 
algorithms are clearly going to be a large part of the world’s econ-
omy moving forward, it is imperative to come up with adequate 
tools for detecting algorithmic cartels, which have unprecedented 
 
internally conducting experimental research of pricing algorithms. See Ezrachi & Stucke, 
supra note 8, at 1806. 
342 See supra Part I.A. 
343 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004). 
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potential to harm consumers. Arguably, tacit algorithmic collu-
sion—reached by deep-learning algorithms—can present an even 
greater threat to consumers. Because the firms that employ these 
deep-learning algorithms can collude without even knowing it,  
authorities face a challenging question of whether they can impose 
any liability on such firms. While it is unclear whether agencies 
should regulate such deep-learning algorithms, the government 
should certainly continue to enforce the existing antitrust laws. 
Whereas cartel screening is a desirable but out-of-reach regulatory 
tool, the whistleblower bounty program can be implemented imme-
diately. Because the whistleblower statute would enable the DOJ to 
increase its detection rate of not only regular, but also algorithmic 
cartels, the passage of such a statute—followed by the launch of car-
tel screening—is more urgent than ever for eliminating price-fixing 
cartels. As price-fixing cartels employ new means such as advanced 
algorithms to carry out their conspiracies, Congress’s and the DOJ’s 
unwillingness to adopt new tools to fight such cartels is no  
longer acceptable. 
